Abstract. In the traditional symmetric cryptography, the adversary has access only to the inputs and outputs of a cryptographic primitive. In the white-box model the adversary is given full access to the implementation. He can use both static and dynamic analysis as well as fault analysis in order to break the cryptosystem, e.g. to extract embedded secret key. Implementations secure in such model have many applications in industry. However, creating such implementations turns out to be a very challenging if not an impossible task. Recently, Bos et al.
Introduction
White-box cryptography aims to develop cryptographic primitives that can withstand attacks of very powerful adversaries. Those adversaries have full access to the implementations, either in the form of source code or in the form of compiled programs. They can perform both static and dynamic analysis, including debugging, tracing the execution, injecting faults, modifying the program parts, etc. Cryptographic implementation resistant to such attacks is also called strong white-box since it is essentially equivalent to a public key scheme achieved by code-obfuscation means.
In 2002, Chow et al. [10, 11] proposed the first white-box implementations of the AES and DES block ciphers. The main idea was to represent small parts of a block cipher as look-up tables and compose them with randomized invertible mappings to hide the secret key information. Each such look-up table by itself does not give any information about the key. In order to attack such scheme, multiple tables must be considered. Another approach was proposed by Bringer et al. [8] . Instead of look-up tables, the cipher is represented as a sequence of functions over GF (2 n ) for some n, with some additional computations as noise. These functions are then composed with random linear mappings to hide the secret key, similarly to the Chow et al. approach.
Unfortunately, both approaches fell to practical attacks [1, 12, 21] . Consequent attempts to fix them were not successful [20, 22, 24] . Moreover, Michiels et al. generalized attack by Billet et al. [1] and showed that Chow et al. approach is not secure for any SPN cipher with MDS matrices. This follows from the efficient cryptanalysis of any SASAS structure [4] . Recently several white-box schemes based on ASASA structure were proposed [2] . However the strong white-box scheme from that paper was broken [3, 15, 23] (which also broadens the white-box attacker's arsenal even further). Another recent approach consists in obfuscating a block cipher implementation using candidates for indistinguishability obfuscation (e.g. [14] ).
Besides academia, there are commercial white-box solutions which are used in real products. The design behind those implementations is kept secret, thus adding securityby-obscurity protection. Nevertheless, Bos et al. [5] proposed a framework for attacks on white-box implementations, which can automatically break many white-box implementations. The idea is to apply techniques from grey-box analysis (i.e. side-channel attacks) but using more precise data traces obtained from the implementation. The attack is called differential computation analysis (DCA).
In light of such powerful automated attack the question arises: how to create a whitebox scheme secure against the DCA attack? The most common countermeasure against side-channel attacks is masking. It is natural therefore to apply masking to protect whitebox implementations. We define masking to be any obfuscation method that encodes each original bit by a relatively small amount of bits. Such masking-based obfuscation may be more practical in contrast to cryptographic obfuscation built from current indistinguishability obfuscation candidates [9, 14] . Even if the performance improvement comes at the cost of less rigorous security analysis.
In this paper we describe multiple generic attacks against masked implementations and conclude that the classic Boolean masking (XOR-sharing) is inherently weak. We summarize previous and new attacks in Table 1 . More general nonlinear encodings are needed and we deduce constraints from our attacks. We believe that our results provide new insights on design of white-box implementations. We suggest three nonlinear masking constructions as countermeasures for the attacks. Together with classic linear masking scheme these constructions solve the "value hiding" problem (see Section 4) . The only missing component is a "structure hiding" obfuscation which has to hide only the structure of the circuit. Development of such obfuscation methods is left as a future work.
Outline We provide the notations in Section 2. The general attack setting and the attacks are described in Section 3. We discuss possible countermeasures in Section 4. Finally, we conclude and suggest future work in Section 5.
Notations and Definitions
Throughout the paper, we use the following notations and definitions.
-∧, ∨, ⊕ denote Boolean AND,OR and XOR respectively.
-exp a (b) stands for a b . -F 2 is the finite field of size 2 and F n 2 is the vector space over F 2 of dimension n.
-Elements in vectors are indexed starting from 1. For a vector v from F n 2 we write v = (v 1 , . . . , v n ). 
Notations: n denotes size of the obfuscated circuit or its part selected for the attack; s is the number of shares in the masking scheme; k is the number of key candidates required to compute a particular intermediate value in the circuit; t denotes the correlation order (t ≤ s); ω is the matrix multiplication exponent (e.g. ω = 2.8074 for Strassen algorithm); d is the algebraic degree of the masking decoder (see Section 3);
is the number of monomials of n bit variables of degree at most d .
-|X| denotes the size of the vector/set X. If X is a circuit, |X| denotes number of nodes in it. -Weight of a vector v is the number or nonzero entries in it and is denoted wt(v).
-Correlation of two n-bit vectors v 1 and v 2 is defined as cor( such that a u = 1. Equivalently, it is the maximum degree of a monomial in the ANF of f .
n i is the number of monomials of n bit variables from F 2 of degree at most d.
-Restriction of a Boolean function f by predicates p 1 , p 2 , . . . is denoted by f p 1 , p 2 , . . . .
It is equal to the product of the functions:
The closure of a set S under addition is denoted by span(S).
Attacks On Masked Implementations
We describe the general setting for our attacks. We consider a keyed symmetric primitive, e.g. a block cipher. The white-box designer takes a naive implementation with a hardcoded secret key and obfuscates it producing a white-box implementation. An adversary receives the white-box implementation and her goal is to recover the secret key or a part of it. We restrict our analysis to implementations in the form of Boolean circuits.
Masking. We assume that the white-box designer uses masking in some form, but we do not restrict him from using other obfuscation techniques. The only requirement is that there exists a relatively small set of nodes in the obfuscated circuit (called shares) such that during a legitimate computation the values computed in these nodes sum to a predictable value. We at least expect this to happen with overwhelming probability. In a more general case, we allow arbitrary functions to be used to compute the predictable value from the shares instead of plain XOR. We call these functions decoders. The classic Boolean masking technique is based on the XOR decoder. The number of shares is denoted by s.
A predictable value typically is a value computed in the beginning or in the end of the reference algorithm such that it depends only on a few key bits and on the plaintexts/ciphertexts. In such case the adversary makes a guess for the key bits and computes the corresponding candidate for the predictable value. The total number of candidates is denoted by k.
The obfuscation method may require random bits e.g. for splitting the secret value into random shares. Even if the circuit may have input nodes for random bits in order to achieve non-deterministic encryption, the adversary can easily manipulate them. Therefore, the obfuscation method has to rely on pseudorandomness computed solely from the input. We assume that the adversary can not directly locate the pseudorandomness computations and remove the corresponding nodes. Moreover, the adversary can not predict the generated pseudorandom values with high probability, i.e. such values are not predictable values.
Window coverage. In a typical case shares of a predictable value will be relatively close in the circuit. This fact can be exploited to improve efficiency of the attacks. We cover the circuit by sets of closely located nodes. Any such set is called a window (as in power analysis attack terminology e.g. from [6] ). The described attacks can be applied to each window instead of the full circuit. By varying the window size the attacks may become more efficient. Here we do not investigate methods of choosing the windows to cover a given circuit. One possible approach is to assign each level or a sequence of adjacent levels in the circuit to a window. Choosing the full circuit as a single window is also allowed. In our attacks we assume that a coverage is already chosen. For simplicity, we describe how each attack is applied to a single window. In case when multiple windows are chosen, the attack has to be repeated for each window. The window size is denoted by n. It is equal to the circuit size in case of a single window coverage.
General DCA attack. We would like to note that the term "differential computation analysis" (DCA) is very general. In [5] the authors introduced it mainly for the correlationbased attack. In fact our new attacks fit the term well and provide new tools for the "analysis" stage of the attack. The first stage remains the same except that we adopt the terminology for the case of Boolean circuits instead of recording the memory access traces. Our view of the procedure of the DCA attack on a white-box implementation C is given in the Algorithm 1.
We remark that the correlation-based DCA attack from [5] can be implemented onthe-fly, without computing the full vectors v j . In contrast, most of our attacks require the full vectors.
In the following two sections we describe two classes of DCA attacks: combinatorial and algebraic. They both follow the procedure described above and differ only in the analysis part (Step 6a). Afterwards, we describe two fault-injection attacks which allow to find locations of shares efficiently. i. Record the predictable value computed using plaintext pi (or ciphertext ci) asṽj,i. 3. Generate a bit-vector vj = (vj,1, . . . , v j,|P | ) of computed bits for each node j in the circuit.
Denote by V the set of all vectors vj: V = {v1, . . . , v |C| }. 4. Generate a bit-vectorṽj = (ṽj,1, . . . ,ṽ j,|P | ) for each predictable value j. Denote byṼ the set of all predictable vectorsṽj:Ṽ = {ṽ1, . . . ,ṽ k }. 5. Choose a coverage of V by windows of size n. 6. For each window in the coverage:
(a) Perform analysis on the window W ⊆ V using the set of predictable valuesṼ .
Combinatorial DCA attacks
The most straightforward way to attack a masked implementation is to guess location of shares inside the current window. For each guess we need to check if the shares match the predictable value. In the basic case of classic Boolean masking where the decoder function is simply XOR of the shares the check is trivial. If an unknown general decoder function has to be considered, the attack becomes more difficult. One particularly interesting case is a basic XOR decoder with added noise. The main attack method in such cases is correlation.
Correlation attack. The correlation DCA attack from [5] is based on correlation between single bits. However, in the case of classic Boolean masking with strong pseudorandom masks all s shares are required to perform a successful correlation attack. In the case of a nonlinear decoder less shares may be enough: even a single share correlation can break many schemes as demonstrated in [5] . Existing higher-order power analysis attacks are directly applicable to memory or value traces of white-box implementations. However, the values leaked in the white-box setting are exact in contrast to side-channel setting and the attack may be described in a simpler way. We reformulate the higher-order correlation attack in our DCA framework. Assume that locations of t shares are guessed and t vectors v j are selected. For simplicity, we denote them by (v 1 , . . . , v t ). For each t-bit vector m we compute the bit-vector u m where
In other words, u m,i is equal to 1 if and only if during encryption of the i-th plaintext the shares took the value described by m . For each predictable vectorṽ we compute the correlation cor(u m ,ṽ). If its absolute value is above a predefined threshold, we conclude that the attack succeeded and possibly recover part of the key from the predictable valuẽ v. Furthermore, the entire vector of correlations (cor(u (0,...,0) ,ṽ), cor(u (0,...,1) ,ṽ), . . .) may be used in analysis, e.g. the average value of its absolute entries.
For the attack to succeed we need the correlated shares to hit at least one combination m constant number of times (that is obtain wt(u m ) ≥ const). Therefore the data complexity is |P | = O(2 t ). However, with larger number of shares the noise increases and more data may be required. We estimate the time complexity of the attack as O(n t k2 t |P |) = O(n t k2 2t ). Here n t corresponds to guessing location of shares inside each window (we assume t n); k corresponds to iterating over all predictable values; 2 2t corresponds to iterating over all t-bit vectors m and computing the correlations.
The main advantage of this attack is its generality. It works against general decoder functions even with additional observable noise. In fact, the attack may work even if we correlate less shares than the actual encoding requires. Indeed, the attack from [5] relied on single-bit correlations and still was successfully applied to break a lot of whitebox designs. The generality of the attack makes it inefficient for some special cases, in particular for the classic Boolean masking. We investigate this special case and describe more efficient attacks.
Time-Memory Trade-off. We now consider the case of XOR decoder and absence of observable noise. That is, the decoder function must map the shares to the correct predictable value for all recorded plaintexts. In such case we can use extra memory to improve the attack. Consider two simple cases by number of shares:
1. Assume that the decoder uses a single share (i.e. unprotected implementation). We precompute all the predictable vectors and put them in a table. Then we simply sweep through the circuit nodes and for each vector v i check if it is in the table. For the right predictable vectorṽ we will have a match. 2. Assume that the decoder uses two shares (i.e. first-order protected implementation).
We are looking for indices i, j such that v i ⊕ v j =ṽ for some predictable vectorṽ. Equivalently, v i =ṽ ⊕ v j . We sweep through the window's nodes and put all the node vectors in a table. Then we sweep again and for each vector v j in the window and for each predictable vectorṽ we check if v j ⊕ṽ is in the table. For the rightṽ we will have a match and it will reveal both shares.
This method easily generalizes for arbitrary number of shares. We put the larger half of shares on the left side of the equation and put the corresponding tuples of vectors in the table. Then we compute the tuples of vectors for the smaller half of shares and look-up them in the table. We remark that this attack's complexity still has combinatorial explosion. However the time-memory trade-off essentially allows to half the exponent in the complexity.
The attack effectively checks n s k sums of vectors to be equal to zero. To avoid false positives, the data complexity should be set to O(s log 2 n + log 2 k). We consider this data complexity negligible, especially because for large number of shares the attack quickly becomes infeasible. The attack becomes irrelevant for large numbers of shares. For simplicity, we assume the data complexity is O(1). Then, the time complexity of the attack is O((n s/2 + n s/2 k)). The described attack is very efficient for unprotected or first-order masked implementations. For small windows it can also be practical for higher-order protections. In the following section we describe a more powerful attack whose complexity is independent of number of shares.
Algebraic DCA attacks
For the classic Boolean masking the problem of finding shares consists in finding a subset of the window's vectors which sums to the predictable value. Clearly, this is a basic linear algebra problem. Let M be the matrix whose columns are vectors from the current window. For each predictable vectorṽ we solve the equation M × x =ṽ. Any solution vector x reveals shares locations. To avoid false-positive solutions the number |P | of encryptions should be increased proportionally to the window size. For the same matrix M we need to check all predictable vectors. Instead of solving the entire system each time, we precompute the LU decomposition of the matrix and then use it for checking each predictable vector much faster. We estimate the data complexity |P | = O(n) and the time complexity O(n ω + n 2 k), where ω is the matrix multiplication exponent. This attack was independently discovered by the CryptoExperts team and among other techniques was successfully applied [16] during the WhibOx 2017 competition [13] in order to break the winning challenge "Adoring Poitras". We remark that the described attack does not necessary find a solution with minimal possible number of shares. In general, finding a low-weight solution of a linear equation system is known to be a hard problem. Nevertheless, the attack still allows to find the correct predictable vector. The discovered locations of shares also provide valuable information about the white-box design.
We conclude that classic Boolean masking is insecure regardless of the number of shares. The attack complexity is polynomial in the circuit size. Even though it may not be highly practical to apply the attack to entire circuits containing millions of nodes, good window coverage makes the attack much more efficient. The attack becomes especially dangerous if a window containing all shares may be located by analyzing the circuit. Indeed, this is how team CryptoExperts attacked the main circuit of the winning challenge of the WhibOx competition. They obtained a minimized circuit containing around 300000 nodes; they draw the data dependency graph (DDG) of the top 5% nodes and visually located several groups of 50 nodes and successfully mounted the described linear attack on each of the groups.
Generalization through linearization. The described linear attack suggests that a nonlinear masking scheme has to be used. We show that the attack can be generalized to nonlinear masking schemes as well. Of course, the complexity grows faster. Still, the attack can be used to estimate the security of such implementations.
The generalization is based on the linearization technique. The idea is to compute products of vectors (with bitwise AND) and include them as possible shares of the predictable vector. Each such product corresponds to a possible monomial in the algebraic normal form of the decoder function. The correct linear combination of monomials equals to the decoder function. The corresponding linear combination of products of vectors equals to the correct predictable vector.
The set of products may be filtered. If a bound on the degree of the decoder function is known, products with higher degrees are not included. For example, for a quadratic decoder function only the vectors v i and all pairwise products v i v j should be included.
The data complexity is dependent on the number of possible monomials in the decoder function. For simplicity, we consider an upper bound d on the algebraic degree. Then the number of possible monomials is equal to σ(n, d) = 
We describe an interesting scenario where this generalized attack is highly relevant. Assume that a white-box designer first applies classic Boolean masking to the reference circuit. Afterwards, each intermediate bit is encoded by e.g. 8 bits using a random nonlinear encoding. The masked circuit then is transformed into a network of lookup tables which perform operations on the encoded bits without explicitly decoding them. The motivation for such scheme is that there will be no correlation between a single 8-bit encoding and any predictable vector because of the linear masking applied under the hood. For the generalized linear attack the degree bound is equal to 8 and normally, the time complexity would be impractical. However, in this case the lookup tables reveal the locations of encodings, i.e. the 8-bit groups. Therefore, we include only all 2 8 products from each group and no products between groups. The attack works because the predictable value is a linear combination of XOR-shares which in turn are linear combinations of products (monomials) from each group.
Fault Attacks
Initially, we assumed that the adversary knows the obfuscated circuit and can analyze it in an arbitrary way. Still, the attacks described in previous sections were passive: they relied on analysis of computed intermediate values during encryptions of random plaintexts. In this section we show that active attacks (fault injections) can also be used to attack masked white-box implementations. We assume that the classic Boolean masking is used. We also allow any form of integrity protection which protects the values but does not protect the shares. As shares of the same value should be placed closely in the circuit, a window coverage can be used to improve efficiency of this attack too. The idea is to choose two shares only inside each window and not across the windows.
The described attack allows to locate all shares of each value, independently of the sharing degree. The attack performs O(n 2 ) encryptions and has time complexity O(|C|n 2 ).
One-Share Fault Injection. Recall that we allow an integrity protection on the values but not on the shares. One possible way an integrity protection may be implemented is to perform the computations twice and spread the difference between two results across the output in some deterministic way. In such way small errors are amplified into random ciphertext differences. In case of such protection or absence of any protection we can improve the efficiency of the fault attack. The main idea for improvements comes from the following observation: if we flip any single share of the same value, the masked value will be flipped as well. This results in a fault injected in the unmasked circuit. Note that the circuit output does not depend on which share was faulted. This observation allows to split the two-share fault attack and perform fault injection only for each node instead of each pair of nodes, at the cost of additional storage:
1. Encrypt a random plaintext p and save the ciphertext E(p). The attack performs O(n) encryptions, which requires O(|C|n) time. It provides substantial improvement over previous attack, though it requires stronger assumption about the implementation. The most relevant counter-example is when the integrity protection does not amplify the error but simply returns a fixed output for any detected error. In a sense, such protection does not reveal any information about the fault in the output. On the other hand, it may be possible to locate the error checking part in the circuit and remove the protection.
For each intermediate node
The attacks can be adopted for nonlinear masking as well. In such case the injected fault may leave the masked value unflipped. When a zero difference is observed in the output, the fault injection should be repeated for another plaintexts. As plaintext is the only source of pseudorandomness, changing the plaintext should result in different values of shares. Flipping a share would result in flipping the masked value with nonzero probability. The exact probability depends on the decoder function.
Remark. The two described attacks perform faults on nodes of the circuit. In some cases, a node value may be used as a share of multiple different values. For example, if the same pseudorandom value is used to mask several values. A more general variant of attacks would inject faults on wires. However, multiple wires have to be faulted in order to have a guaranteed fault of a share. Though, the guaranteed fault is not necessary for the attack. Intuitively, getting the same faulted output by flipping different nodes or wires uncovers important structural information about the white-box design (if the space of faulted outputs is large enough).
Countermeasures
The attacks described in the previous section significantly narrow down the space of masking schemes useful for white-box obfuscation. We deduce the following main constraints:
1. The number of shares must be high enough to avoid combinatorial attacks. Moreover, the minimum number of shares that correlate with reference circuit values must be high as well. 2. The decoder functions must have high enough degree to avoid algebraic attack. 3. The circuit must not admit analysis which allows to locate shares of the same values. 4. The integrity of pseudorandom shares must be protected.
The aim of this paper is to analyze the possibility of using masking schemes with relatively small number of shares for the white-box cryptography. The complexity of combinatorial attacks splits into two parts: locating the shares and correlating them. If the number of shares is very high then the correlation part becomes infeasible. Possibly, in such case it is not even necessary to hide the location of shares. The downside is that designing such masking schemes is quite challenging and this direction leads into rather theoretical constructions like indistinguishability obfuscation [14] from fully homomorphic encryption and other cryptographic primitives. We aim to find more practical obfuscation techniques. Therefore, we study obfuscation methods relying on hardness of locating shares inside the obfuscated circuit. Such obfuscation is a challenging problem. In the light of described attacks, we split the problem into two components: Value Hiding. The first component basically requires designing a proper masking scheme. As we have shown, the requirements are much stronger than for the usual masking in the side-channel setting (e.g. the provably secure masking by Ishai et al. [19] ). To the best of our knowledge, this direction was not studied in the literature. However, there is a closely related notion: fully homomorphic encryption (FHE). Indeed, it can be seen as an extreme class of masking schemes. FHE encryption is a process of creating shares of a secret value and the FHE's evaluation functions allow to perform arbitrary computations on the ciphertexts (shares) without leaking the secret value. In fact, any secure FHE scheme would solve the "Value Hiding" problem. However, this direction leads to very inefficient schemes: typically FHE schemes have very large ciphertexts. This contradicts our goal to investigate schemes with small number of shares.
We suggest to further split the first component into two parts. The first part is protection against the algebraic attacks. It is a nonlinear masking scheme without low-degree decoders. However, we allow the scheme to be imperfect: the computed values may correlate with the secret values. The second part is protection against correlation attacks. It can be implemented using a provably secure linear masking scheme on top of the nonlinear masking from the first part. The two parts may be composed in the following way: the algebraically secure nonlinear masking scheme is applied to the reference circuit and afterwards the linear masking scheme is applied to the transformed circuit. We investigate possibilities for the algebraically secure nonlinear masking in the next section.
Structure Hiding The second component resembles what is usually understood by software obfuscation. Indeed, the usual software obfuscation aims to obfuscate the control flow graph and hide important operations. Often such obfuscation includes integrity protections to avoid patching. The computed values are not hidden but merely blended among redundant values computed by dummy instructions. For circuits the problem is less obscure and ad hoc. In particular, an integrity protection scheme for circuits was proposed by Ishai et al. in [18] . Though, formalizing the "protection against analysis" is not trivial. Applying structure hiding protection on top of value hiding protection should secure the implementation from attacks described in Section 3. We do not investigate structure hiding further in this paper and leave it as future work.
Algebraically Secure Masking Schemes
We give a broad definition of a masking scheme which we will use throughout this section.
Definition 1 (Masking Scheme
). An N -bit masking scheme is defined by a nonconstant decoding function Dec : F N 2 → F 2 and a set of triplets {( , Eval , C ), . . .} where each triplet consists of:
The following equation must be satisfied for all operators i and all values r:
The degree of the masking scheme is the algebraic degree of the Dec function. The masking scheme is called nonlinear if its degree is at least equal to 2. It is allowed to use different decoding functions for two inputs and output.
Note that Eval takes three arguments in our definition. The first two are masks of the secret values and the third one is optional randomness which must not have effect on the secret values.
We now define the algebraic security of a masking scheme. Note that in a reference circuit of a cryptographic primitive two nodes may be used as AND operands and as XOR operands simultaneously. The algebraic attack then would include combinations of nodes across the two masked operations circuits. Therefore, we need to analyze all Eval circuits together.
Definition 2 (Algebraic Security). Consider an N -bit masking scheme defined as above. Let F be a set of functions computed in the nodes of all circuits C . Let The definition captures only protection against the algebraic attack and only for a single masked operation. Composing masked operations may require additional randomness for refreshing the masks. Given a masking scheme, it is possible to evaluate its algebraic security by running the algebraic attack on the joined Eval circuits. For higher degrees of protection the attack may become impractical even if applied directly to the Eval circuits. Therefore, a provably secure construction for arbitrary orders is an important challenge. Still, the first important problem is how to protect a scheme against the linear algebraic attack. Indeed, even second degree generalized attack may be impractical for large circuits. Therefore, we first aim to find the simplest nonlinear masking scheme.
Minimalist Quadratic Masking. Since the decoding function has to be at least quadratic, we need at least two bits to encode a single bit. For two bits all nonlinear decoding functions are linear equivalent to a quadratic monomial being simply product of the two input bits. Unfortunately, this decoding function is vulnerable to a variant of the linear algebra attack. Any quadratic function with 2-bit input is unbalanced. Therefore, one of the reference bit values can be encoded by 3 different values and the other value has only 1 possible encoding. For example, if the value is equal to 1 and the decoding function is simply AND, the input has to be equal to (1, 1) . In this case there is no randomness involved. The adversary may filter plaintexts and choose only those for which the predictable value of the reference node is equal to 1. Then she will know that the masks are equal to 1 in this subset of executions. She can not apply the linear algebra attack directly, because the all-one vector would typically occur in the circuit in many places. However, she can add a single plaintext that is not in the subset. In this case one of the shares has to be equal to zero and the share's vector becomes all-one vector followed by one zero. Such vector would not occur in the circuit by chance because the subset of plaintexts was specially crafted. This attack has to be taken into consideration when designing a nonlinear masking scheme. The conclusion is that any value of the original bit should include randomness in its encoding. In particular, the decoding function can not be a point function. That's why the definition of algebraic security uses restrictions of the functions.
As we showed that there does not exist secure 2-bit encoding, we move on to 3-bit encodings. The simplest quadratic function using all 3 input bits a, b, c is ab ⊕ c. Note the similarity with the broken 2-bit scheme: the quadratic monomial ab is simply linearly masked by c. However, this linear mask is enough to prevent the attack: in this case Dec(a, b, c) = 1 does not imply a = 1 or b = 1. In fact, such Dec is balanced: both 0 and 1 have exactly 4 preimages. The expressions for masked operations are not hard to find as well. In addition, we also describe a refresh-gadget which injects external randomness into mask: 
It is easy to verify that Eval XOR and Eval AN D satisfy the requirements from the Definition 1. In addition, Ref resh(a, r) returns fresh random encoding of Dec(a), meaning that Dec(a) = Dec (Ref resh(a, r) ) for any r and new masks reveal no information about the old masks. Extending the Eval functions by refreshing input and output masks with fresh random values makes each application of Eval independent from the others and allows free composition of the masked operations.
The proposed masking scheme is first-order algebraically secure for circuits based on the provided expressions (the order of XORs is not important). The space of all linear combinations of functions computed in the circuit nodes is spanned by the computed monomials a, b, c, d, e, f, ae, bd, cd, cde, bf, abf, cf . Note that a restriction of a linear combination of monomials is equal to the linear combination of restrictions of monomials.
Therefore, we only need to check that there are no constant linear combinations of restrictions of the monomials by predicates (ab ⊕ c =x, de ⊕ f =ỹ). We confirmed this and also experimentally verified that the linear algebra attack does not succeed.
Random Encodings. In search of higher-order secure schemes we investigate the possibility of using random nonlinear encodings. The idea is to use random decoding functions for each bit in the circuit. Each Eval each takes two bits with decoders Dec 1 , Dec 2 and returns bit with a random decoder Dec. The function Eval is constructed by defining
where r 1 , . . . , r N −1 are some random Boolean functions generating the output randomness from the input shares and Enc is a random N -bit bijection. Observe that Enc −1 contains the output decoder: the first bit of Enc −1 (Eval (x 1 , x 2 )) is equal to the result of unmasked operation Dec 1 (x 1 ) Dec 2 (x 2 ). Finally, Eval is implemented as a circuit from its look-up table using some generic method to avoid computation of unmasked values.
Unfortunately, random encodings are unlikely to completely solve the problem. We describe a heuristic argument which shows that circuits implementing masked operations on random encodings are likely to be susceptible to the algebraic attacks. The argument is based on counting functions. First, we show that number of nonlinear gates in the circuit implementing masked operation Eval is a relevant parameter. Circuits with fewer nonlinear gates have more chances to be secure against the algebraic attack. Proposition 1. Consider an arbitrary Boolean circuit. Let F be a set of all functions computed in the circuit's nodes (including inputs). Let N be a set of all functions computed in the circuit's nonlinear nodes (i.e. any node except XOR, NOT) together with functions returning input bits and the constant 1 function. Then the linear subspaces spanned by F and by N are the same and, therefore, dim span(F) = dim span(N ) ≤ |N |.
Proof. We need to prove that span(F) = span(N ). It is sufficient to show that any function from F belongs to span(N ). We prove by induction on circuit levels. The first level contains input nodes. They belong to N by definition. Assume that the proposition is proved for k levels and consider (k + 1)-th level. A XOR node on (k + 1)-th level corresponds to a linear combination of functions from lower levels which belong to span(N ) by induction hypothesis. Therefore, each such XOR node computes a function from span(N ) as well. Similarly, any NOT node from (k +1)-th level corresponds to a linear combination of a function from k-th level and the constant 1 function. Any other node belongs to N by definition.
We conclude that circuits for evaluating operations on masked values should have fewer nonlinear gates to avoid algebraic attacks. We use lower bounds on the number of nonlinear gates for random Boolean functions and provide a heuristic estimation of the resilience of random encodings to algebraic attacks.
Proposition 2 (heuristic).
Consider a Boolean circuit with n inputs and n outputs computing a random function. Let F and N be set of functions computed in the circuit's nodes as in Proposition 1. Any Boolean function g with n inputs can be expressed as a function g applied to functions from F. It can be expected that for any g there exists such g of degree at most 3.
Proof. The heuristic is based on a counting argument. The number of all Boolean functions of n bits is equal to exp 2 (2 n ). Recall that N includes the input variables and the constant 1 function. Boyar et al. [7] show that almost all Boolean functions with n inputs require at least 2 n/2 − n − 1 AND gates. Using this bound we obtain that |N | ≥ 2 n/2
(except for negligible fraction of Boolean functions). The number of distinct functions in span(F) is equal to exp 2 (dim span(F)) which is upper bounded by exp 2 (|N |) by Proposition 1. By applying cubic functions to N we can generate exp 2 (σ(|N |, 3)) ≈ exp 2 (2 3n/2 /6) functions. It is reasonable to expect few linear dependencies and then exp 2 (2 3n/2 /6) functions would cover all exp 2 (2 n ) Boolean functions. Under this assumption, any Boolean function applied to the inputs can be computed as a cubic function applied to the circuit nodes.
According to the proposition, the generalized linear algebra attack from Section 3.2 can always be applied to random encodings with linearization degree at most 3. Still, the counting argument shows that random encodings may be useful for protecting against the degree 1 attack and possibly against degree 2 attack.
Goudarzi et al. [17] described a heuristic method for constructing circuits for n-bit SBoxes with approximately √ n2 n/2+1 AND gates. At most exp 2 (2 n/2+1 ) out of exp 2 (2 n ) distinct functions may be computed from linear combinations of such circuit's nodes. Therefore, such encoding should be secure against the linear algebraic attack. After a circuit for Eval is generated, its security must be evaluated against the attack. For a compositional security we would need to compose each Eval with a refresh-gadget and evaluate this composition against the attack as well. Such gadget can be constructed similarly to Eval by constructing a look-up table and then synthesizing a circuit for it.
Unless a special method for constructing circuits from look-up tables is developed, we expect that random encodings are useful for at most second-order security. The minimalist quadratic masking described above suits better for first-order protection from performance considerations. However, random encodings may offer additional security: the white-box designer may keep them secret. This will prevent attacks exploiting known structure patterns in the masking circuit. However, it is related to the structure hiding problem which we do not consider here. We also expect that it is possible to find random 4-bit encodings with circuits satisfying second-order algebraic security. It may be inefficient to generate random encoding for each node in the reference circuit, but even a single public encoding can be useful as a second-order protection.
FHE-based Encodings. We recall that FHE schemes are a good solution to the full "Value Hiding" problem. The FHE scheme even does not have to be secure in the usual sense: the security parameters may be degraded to have ciphertexts of just a few bits. It is highly likely that after such extreme degradation the scheme will become weak: ciphertext bits will correlate with the secret bit. As we have shown, this problem may be solved by applying a linear masking scheme on top. For the algebraically secure scheme the only requirement is that no predictable value should be computable from the nodes of the modified circuit using low-degree functions.
We describe a simple FHE-style encoding. Choose two small distinct odd primes p, q and let n = pq. Define the encoding of a bitṽ ∈ {0, 1} to be any value v in {0, . . . , n − 1} such that Dec(v) = v mod p =ṽ. The expressions for masked operations together with a refreshing gadget are given in Figure 2 . 
EvalXOR(v1, v2) = (v1 + v2 − 2v1v2) mod n,
EvalAND(v1, v2) = (v1v2) mod n,
Ref resh(v, pr) = (v + pr) mod n.
It is easy to verify that Eval XOR and Eval AN D satisfy the requirements from the Definition 1. The randomness used in the encoding can be retrieved as v mod q. As randomness can degrade to 0 or 1 over time, it should be refreshed by adding a fresh random multiple of p to the encoded value.
The security of the scheme depends on the circuit implementing the masked operations using modular additions and multiplications. Each implementation has to be evaluated against the (generalized) linear attack. According to our experiments, setting n = 3 × 5 is enough for protection against the linear attack. This setting results in 4-bit nonlinear encoding. We expect that for larger values of n the scheme has higher order algebraic security. Indeed, the remainder mod p function has full algebraic degree and security of the scheme depends only on how it is implemented. However, the arithmetic incurs a noticeable overhead. For small values of n it may be possible that generic method of synthesizing circuits with few AND gates (e.g. by Goudarzi et al. [17] ) would be more efficient.
Conclusions
In this paper we investigated the possibility of using masking techniques for white-box implementations. We presented several attacks applicable in different scenarios. As a result we obtain requirements for a masking scheme to be useful. We divide the requirements into value hiding and structure hiding. Furthermore, we show that value hiding may be achieved using an algebraically secure nonlinear masking scheme and a classic linear masking scheme. We suggest three constructions for algebraically secure nonlinear masking. Therefore, a value hiding protection can be implemented. We leave the structure hiding problem as a future work.
